Chapter III: Which arts are chiefly to be read
Level 4 starts here: Book 3
Of all the sciences listed above, the ancients set apart seven in particular in their studies, for the work of educating the young. They saw so much more use in these than in all the rest that whoever had firmly grasped the teaching of these seven could afterwards come to know the others by inquiring and practising rather than by hearing. For these are, as it were, the best instruments and first elements, by which a way is prepared for the mind to a full knowledge of philosophical truth. Hence the names trivium and quadrivium: by these, as by certain roads, a lively mind enters the secret places of wisdom. In those days no one seemed worthy of the name of master who could not claim knowledge of these seven. Pythagoras too, we read, kept this custom in his school: for seven years, by the number of the seven liberal arts, none of his pupils dared to ask the reason for what he said, but trusted the master's words until he had heard everything, and so could then find the reason for them by himself. Some, we read, learned these seven with such zeal that they held them all in memory, so that whatever writings they afterwards took in hand, and whatever questions they put forward to be solved or proved, they did not turn over the leaves of books looking for rules and reasons to settle the point in doubt, but had each one ready at once by heart. That, surely, is why there were so many wise men in that age that they wrote more than we can read. But our students either will not or cannot keep a fitting method in learning, and so we find many who study and few who are wise. To me it seems that a reader must take no less care not to spend his effort on useless studies than not to stay lukewarm in a good and useful purpose. It is bad to do a good thing carelessly; it is worse to spend much labour in vain. But since not everyone has the discernment to see what is good for him, I will briefly show the reader which writings seem to me more useful, and then add a few words on the method of learning as well.
[768A] Quae artes praecipue legendae sint.
Ex his autem omnibus scientiis supra enumeratis, septem specialiter discreverant antiqui in studiis suis ad opus erudiendorum, in quibus tantam utilitatem esse prae ceteris omnibus perspexerunt, ut, quisquis harum disciplinam firmiter percepisset, ad aliarum notitiam postea inquirendo magis et exercendo quam audiendo perveniret. sunt enim quasi optima quaedam instrumenta et rudimenta quibus via paratur animo ad plenam philosophicae veritatis notitiam. hinc trivium et quadrivium nomen accepit, eo quod his, quasi quibusdam viis, vivax animus ad secreta sophiae introeat. nemo tunc temporis nomine magistri dignus videbatur, qui non harum septem scientiam profiteri posset. [768B] Pythagoras quoque hanc in studiis suis consuetudinem servasse legitur, ut usque ad septenium, secundum numerum videlicet septem liberalium artium, nullus discipulorum suorum de his quae ab ipso dicebantur rationem poscere auderet, sed fidem dare verbis magistri quousque omnia audivisset, sicque iam per semetipsum rationem eorum posset invenire. has septem tanto studio quidam didicisse leguntur, ut plane omnes ita in memoria tenerent, ut, quascunque scripturas deinde ad manum sumpsissent, quascumque quaestiones solvendas aut comprobandas proposuissent, ex his regulas et rationes ad definiendum id de quo ambigeretur folia librorum revolvendo non quaererent, sed statim singula corde parata haberent. [768C] hinc profecto accidit tot eo tempore fuisse sapientes ut plura ipsi scriberent quam nos legere possimus. scholares vero nostri aut nolunt aut nesciunt modum congruum in discendo servare, et idcirco multos studentes, paucos sapientes invenimus. mihi vero videtur non minori cura providendum esse lectori, ne in studiis inutilibus operam suam expendat quam ne in bono et utili proposito tepidus remaneat. malum est bonum negligenter agere, peius est in vanum labores multos expendere. sed quia non omnes hanc discretionem habere possunt, ut intelligant quid sibi expediat, idcirco, quae scripturae mihi utiliores videantur, lectori breviter demonstrabo, ac deinde de modo quoque discendi pauca adnectam.
Chapter IV: On the two kinds of writings
There are two kinds of writings. The first kind is those called the arts proper; the second is those that are appendages of the arts. The arts are those ranked under philosophy, that is, those that have some definite and fixed part of philosophy as their subject matter, such as grammar, dialectic and others of this kind. The appendages of the arts are those that only look towards philosophy, that is, those that deal with some subject matter outside philosophy. Yet sometimes they touch, here and there and in confusion, on things torn from the arts, or, if they are plain narrative, they prepare the way to philosophy. Of this kind are all the songs of the poets, such as tragedies, comedies, satires, heroic and lyric verse, iambics and certain didactic poems; fables and histories too; and also the writings of those whom we now usually call philosophers, who are in the habit of stretching a brief matter out with long windings of words and obscuring an easy sense with tangled speech, or of piling different things together to make one picture, as if out of many colours and shapes. Note the distinction I have drawn for you. There are two things, the arts and the appendages of the arts. But between them there seems to me as great a distance as the poet describes:
[768D] De duobus generibus scripturarum.
Duo sunt genera scripturarum. primum genus est earum quae propriae artes appellantur. secundum est earum quae sunt appendicia artium. artes sunt quae philosophiae supponuntur, id est, quae aliquam certam et determinatam partem philosophiae materiam habent, ut est grammatica, dialectica, et ceterae huiusmodi. appendentia artium sunt quae tantum ad philosophiam spectant, id est, quae in aliqua extra philosophiam materia versantur. aliquando tamen quaedam ab artibus discerpta sparsim et confuse attingunt, vel si simplex narratio est, viam ad philosophiam praeparant. huiusmodi sunt omnia poetarum carmina, ut sunt tragoediae, comoediae, satirae, heroica quoque et lyrica, [769A] et iambica, et didascalica quaedam, fabulae quoque et historiae, illorum etiam scripta quos nunc philosophos appellare solemus, qui et brevem materiam longis verborum ambagibus extendere consueverunt, et facilem sensum perplexis sermonibus obscurare. vel etiam diversa simul compilantes, quasi de multis coloribus et formis, unam picturam facere. nota quae tibi distinxi. duo sunt, artes et appendicia artium. sed inter haec tanta mihi distantia esse videtur, ut ille ait:
As far as the pliant willow yields to the pale olive,
As far as the lowly wild nard yields to crimson rose beds,
Lenta salix quantum pallenti cedit olivae,
Puniceis humilis quantum saliunca rosetis.
so that anyone who longs to reach knowledge, if he leaves the truth of the arts and chooses to entangle himself in the rest, will find a labour that is, I will not say endless, but very great, and the fruit small. In short, the arts without their appendages can make a reader perfect; the appendages without the arts can add nothing to perfection, above all since they hold nothing worth seeking to draw the reader except what is carried over from the arts and fitted to them, and no one looks for anything in them but what belongs to the arts. For this reason it seems to me that effort should be given first to the arts, where the foundations of everything lie and pure and simple truth is laid open, above all to these seven I have named, which are the instruments of all philosophy. Then let the rest be read too, if there is time, because play mixed with serious things sometimes delights more, and rarity makes a good thing precious. So a maxim found in the middle of a story is sometimes held more eagerly. Even so, the foundation of all learning lies in the seven liberal arts, and they above all must be kept at hand, since without them philosophical teaching neither does nor can explain and define anything. These arts hold together so closely, and each needs the reasons of the others in turn, that if even one is missing the rest cannot make a philosopher. So those seem to me to go wrong who, not noticing this coherence among the arts, pick out some of them for themselves and, leaving the others untouched, think they can become perfect in these.
ita ut quicumque ad scientiam pertingere cupit, si relicta veritate artium reliquis se implicare voluerit, materiam laboris, [769B] ut non dicam infinitam, plurimam inveniat et fructum exiguum. denique artes sine appendiciis suis perfectum facere lectorem possunt, illa sine artibus nihil perfectionis conferre valent, maxime cum nihil in se expetendum habeant unde lectorem invitent nisi traductum ab artibus et accommodatum, neque quisquam in eis quaerat nisi quod artium est. quapropter mihi videtur primum operam dandam esse artibus ubi fundamenta sunt omnium, et pura simplexque veritas aperitur, maxime his septem quas praedixi, quae totius philosophiae instrumenta sunt. deinde cetera quoque, si vacat, legantur, quia aliquando plus delectare solent seriis admixta ludicra, et raritas pretiosum facit bonum. sic in medio fabulae cursu inventam sententiam avidius aliquando retinemus. [769C] verumtamen in septem liberalibus artibus fundamentum est omnis doctrinae, quae prae ceteris omnibus ad manum habendae sunt, utpote sine quibus nihil solet aut potest disciplina philosophica explicare et definire. hae quidem ita sibi cohaerent et alternis vicissim rationibus indigent, ut si vel una defuerit, ceterae philosophum facere non possunt. unde mihi errare videntur qui non attendentes talem in artibus cohaerentiam quasdam sibi ex ipsis eligunt, et, ceteris intactis, in his se posse fieri perfectos putant.
Chapter V: That each art must be given what is its own
There is another error, not much smaller than this one, which must be avoided above all. For there are some who, though they leave out nothing that ought to be read, do not know how to give each art what is its own, but read all the arts in each one. In grammar they argue about the theory of syllogisms; in dialectic they inquire into the endings of cases; and, what deserves more ridicule, they read almost the whole book in its title and barely get through the word 'incipit' (here begins) by the third lecture. Men like this do not teach others; they show off their knowledge. If only they looked to everyone as they look to me. Notice how perverse this habit is: the more superfluous things you pile up, the less you can take in or keep of the things that are useful. In any art, then, two things above all must be told apart and kept separate: first, how the art itself ought to be treated; second, how the art's reasons ought to be applied to other matters. There are two things: to treat of an art, and to treat by means of an art. For example, to treat of an art is to treat of grammar; to treat by means of the art is to treat grammatically. Distinguish these two: to treat of grammar, and to treat grammatically. He treats of grammar who handles the rules given about words and the precepts that belong to this art. Everyone who speaks or writes by rule treats grammatically. To treat of grammar, then, belongs only to certain writings, such as Priscian, Donatus and Servius; but to treat grammatically belongs to all. So when we treat of any art, above all in teaching, where everything should be drawn into a short compass and set out for easy understanding, it should be enough to explain the matter in hand as briefly and clearly as possible, in case by multiplying reasons foreign to it we confuse the reader more than we build him up. Not everything we can say should be said, in case the things we ought to say are said less usefully. In each art, then, look for what is shown to belong to it specially. Then, when you have read the arts and come to know, by disputing and comparing, what is proper to each, then at last it will be right to compare the reasons of each with the others, and by looking from one to another to search out what you had understood less well before. Do not multiply byways until you have learned the paths. You will range about safely once you have no fear of going astray.
Unicuique arti quod suum est tribuendum esse.
[769D] Est rursum alius error non multo minor isto, quem summopere vitare oportet. sunt enim quidam, qui licet ex his quae legenda sunt nihil praetermittant, nulli tamen arti quod suum est tribuere norunt, sed in singulis legunt omnes. in grammatica de syllogismorum ratione disputant, in dialectica inflexiones casuales inquirunt, et quod magis irrisione dignum est, in titulo totum paene legunt librum, et 'incipit' tertia vix lectione expediunt. non alios docent huiusmodi, sed ostentant suam scientiam. sed utinam quales mihi, tales omnibus apparerent! [770A] attende quam perversa sit haec consuetudo, cum profecto quanto magis superflua aggregaveris, tanto minus ea quae utilia sunt capere possis vel retinere. in qualibet igitur arte duo nobis maxime discernenda sunt et distinguenda, primum, qualiter oporteat de ipsa arte agere, secundum, qualiter oporteat ipsius artis rationes quibuslibet aliis rebus accommodare. duo sunt, agere de arte, et agere per artem. verbi gratia, agere de arte, ut est agere de grammatica, agere per artem, ut est agere grammatice. distingue haec duo, agere de grammatica, et agere grammatice. de grammatica agit, qui regulas de vocibus datas et praecepta ad hanc artem pertinentia tractat. grammatice agit omnis qui regulariter loquitur vel scribit. agere igitur de grammatica quibusdam tantummodo scripturis, ut Prisciano, Donato, Servio convenit, agere vero grammatice, omnibus. cum igitur de qualibet arte agimus, maxime in docendo, ubi omnia ad compendium restringenda sunt [770B] et ad facilem intelligentiam evocanda, sufficere debet id de quo agitur quantum brevius et apertius potest explanare, ne si alienas nimium rationes multiplicaverimus, magis turbemus quam aedificemus lectorem. non omnia dicenda sunt quae dicere possumus, ne minus utiliter dicantur ea quae dicere debemus. id tandem in unaquaque arte quaeras quod ad eam specialiter pertinere constiterit. deinde cum legeris artes, et quid uniuscuiusque sit proprium agnoveris disputando et conferendo, tunc demum rationes singularum invicem conferre licebit, et ex alterna consideratione vicissim quae minus prius intellexeras investigare. noli multiplicare diverticula quoadusque semitas didiceris. securus discurres cum errare non timueris.
Chapter VI: What is necessary for study
Three things are necessary for students: nature, practice and discipline. Under nature we consider whether a student readily grasps what he hears and firmly keeps what he has grasped; under practice, whether he cultivates his natural sense by labour and diligence; under discipline, whether, living in a way worthy of praise, he joins good conduct to knowledge. On these three, one by one, we will touch briefly, by way of introduction.
[770C] Quid sit necessarium studio.
Tria sunt studentibus necessaria: natura, exercitium, disciplina. in natura consideratur ut facile audita percipiat et percepta firmiter retineat; in exercitio, ut labore et sedulitate naturalem sensum excolat; in disciplina, ut laudabiliter vivens mores cum scientia componat. de his tribus per singula modo introductionis pauca perstringemus.
Chapter VII: On ability, which belongs to nature
Those who give themselves to learning should be strong both in ability and in memory. These two hold together so closely in every study and discipline that if one is missing, the other cannot lead anyone to perfection; just as no gains can profit where there is no safekeeping, and he builds storehouses in vain who has nothing to store in them. Ability finds wisdom and memory keeps it. Ability is a certain power planted in the mind by nature, strong in itself. Ability starts from nature, is helped by use, is blunted by immoderate labour and is sharpened by moderate exercise. Hence someone said quite elegantly: 'I would have you spare yourself at last: there is labour in your papers; run out into the open air.' Two things exercise ability: reading and meditation. Reading is when we are formed by rules and precepts drawn from what has been written. Reading is of three kinds: the teacher's, the learner's, and that of one who studies a book by himself. For we say 'I read the book to him', 'I read the book under him', and 'I read the book'. In reading, order and method above all are to be considered.
[771B] Hoc ad naturam de ingenio.
Qui doctrinae operam dant, ingenio simul et memoria pollere debent, quae duo in omni studio et disciplina ita sibi cohaerent, ut si desit alterum, neminem alterum ad perfectum ducere possit, sicut nulla prodesse possunt lucra ubi deest custodia, et incassum receptacula munit qui quod recondat non habuerit. ingenium invenit et memoria custodit sapientiam. [771C] ingenium est vis quaedam naturaliter animo insita per se valens. ingenium a natura proficiscitur, usu iuvatur, immoderato labore retunditur, et temperato acuitur exercitio. unde satis eleganter a quodam dictum est: Volo tandem tibi parcas, labor est in chartis, curre per aera. duo sunt quae ingenium exercent: lectio et meditatio. lectio est, cum ex his quae scripta sunt, regulis et praeceptis informamur. trimodum est lectionis genus: docentis, discentis, vel per se inspicientis. dicimus enim 'lego librum illi,' et 'lego librum ab illo,' et 'lego librum.' in lectione maxime consideranda sunt ordo et modus.
Chapter VIII: On the order of reading
Order is considered one way in the disciplines, as if I should say that grammar is older than dialectic, or arithmetic prior to music; another way in books, as if I should say that the Catiline comes before the Jugurtha; another in narration, which runs in continuous sequence; and another in exposition. Order in the disciplines follows nature; in books, the person of the author or the subject matter; in narration, the arrangement, which is of two kinds: natural, when a thing is told in the order in which it was done, and artificial, when what was done later is told first and what was done first is told afterwards. In exposition, order follows inquiry. Exposition contains three things: the letter, the sense and the deeper meaning. The letter is the fitting arrangement of words, which we also call construction. The sense is a certain easy and plain meaning which the letter shows on its face. The deeper meaning is a more profound understanding, which is found only by exposition or interpretation. Among these the order is this: first the letter is examined, then the sense, then the deeper meaning. When this is done, the exposition is complete.
De ordine legendi.
Ordo consideratur alius in disciplinis, ut si dixerim grammaticam dialectica antiquiorem vel arithmeticam priorem musica, [771D] alius in libris, ut si dixero Catilinarium Iugurthino priorem, alius in narratione, quae est in continua serie, alius in expositione. ordo in disciplinis attenditur secundum naturam, in libris secundum personam auctoris vel subiectam materiam, in narratione secundum dispositionem, quae duplex est; naturalis, videlicet quando res eo refertur ordine quo gesta est, et artificialis, id est, quando id quod postea gestum est prius narratur, et quod prius, postmodum dicitur, in expositione consideratur ordo secundum inquisitionem. expositio tria continet, litteram, sensum, sententiam. littera est congrua ordinatio dictionum, quod etiam constructionem vocamus. sensus est facilis quaedam et aperta significatio, quam littera prima fronte praefert. [772A] sententia est profundior intelligentia, quae nisi expositione vel interpretatione non invenitur. in his ordo est, ut primum littera, deinde sensus, deinde sententia inquiratur. quo facto, perfecta est expositio.
Chapter IX: On the method of reading
The method of reading consists in dividing. Every division begins from what is finite and proceeds towards the infinite. Everything finite is better known and can be grasped by knowledge. Teaching, moreover, begins from what is better known and, by knowing that, reaches knowledge of what lies hidden. Further, we investigate by reason, to which dividing properly belongs, when we descend from universals to particulars by dividing and by investigating the nature of each. For every universal is more determinate than its particulars. When we learn, therefore, we should begin from what is better known, more determinate and more comprehensive, and so, descending little by little and distinguishing each thing by division, investigate the nature of the things contained.
De modo legendi.
Modus legendi in dividendo constat. omnis divisio incipit a finitis, et ad infinita usque progreditur. omne autem finitum magis notum est et scientia comprehensibile. doctrina autem ab his quae magis nota sunt incipit, et per eorum notitiam ad scientiam eorum quae latent pertingit. praeterea ratione investigamus, ad quam proprie pertinet dividere, quando ab universalibus ad particularia descendimus dividendo [772B] et singulorum naturas investigando. omne namque universale magis est determinatum suis particularibus. quando ergo discimus, ab his incipere debemus quae magis sunt nota et determinata et complectentia, sicque paulatim descendendo, et per divisionem singula distinguendo, eorum quae continentur naturam investigare.
Chapter X: On meditation
Meditation is frequent and deliberate thought, which prudently investigates the cause and origin, the manner and the usefulness of each thing. Meditation takes its start from reading, but it is not bound by any of the rules or precepts of reading. For it delights to range over open ground, where it may fix a free gaze on the contemplation of truth, and touch now on these causes of things and now on those, and now go down into every deep thing, leaving nothing doubtful and nothing obscure. The beginning of learning, then, is in reading; its completion is in meditation. If anyone learns to love meditation closely and chooses to give time to it often, it makes life very pleasant and gives the greatest comfort in trouble. For it is meditation above all that separates the soul from the noise of earthly business, and lets it in some way foretaste, even in this life, the sweetness of eternal rest. And when a man has learned to seek and understand, through the things that have been made, the one who made all things, then meditation fills the mind with knowledge and floods it with joy alike; and so the greatest delight lies in meditation. There are three kinds of meditation. One consists in looking carefully at conduct, another in searching out the commandments, the third in investigating the divine works. Conduct lies in vices and virtues. The divine commandment either commands, or promises, or threatens. The work of God is what his power creates, what his wisdom governs and what his grace works with. How worthy of wonder all these are, each person knows the better, the more attentively he has made a habit of meditating on the wonders of God.
De meditatione.
Meditatio est cogitatio frequens cum consilio, quae causam et originem, modum et utilitatem uniuscuiusque rei prudenter investigat. meditatio principium sumit a lectione, nullis tamen stringitur regulis aut praeceptis lectionis. delectatur enim quodam aperto decurrere spatio, ubi liberam contemplandae veritati aciem affigat, et nunc has, [772C] nunc illas rerum causas perstringere, nunc autem profunda quaeque penetrare, nihil anceps, nihil obscurum relinquere. principium ergo doctrinae est in lectione, consummatio in meditatione, quam si quis familiarius amare didicerit eique saepius vacare voluerit, iucundam valde reddit vitam, et maximam in tribulatione praestat consolationem. ea enim maxime est, quae animam a terrenorum actuum strepitu segregat, et in hac vita etiam aeternae quietis dulcedinem quodammodo praegustare facit. cumque iam per ea quae facta sunt eum qui fecit omnia quaerere didicerit et intelligere, tunc animum pariter et scientia erudit et laetitia perfundit, unde fit ut maximum in meditatione sit oblectamentum. tria sunt genera meditationis. [772D] unum constat in circumspectione morum, aliud in scrutatione mandatorum, tertium in investigatione divinorum operum. mores sunt in vitiis et virtutibus. mandatum divinum, aliud praecipiens, aliud promittens, aliud terrens. opus Dei est, et quod creat potentia, et quod moderatur sapientia, et quod cooperatur gratia. quae omnia, quanta sint admiratione digna, tanto magis quisque novit, quanto attentius Dei mirabilia meditari consuevit.
Chapter XI: On memory
On memory, I think this above all must not be passed over here: just as ability investigates and finds by dividing, so memory keeps by gathering. What we have divided in learning, then, we must gather together to commit to memory. To gather is to reduce what has been written or argued at length to a brief and compact summary, which the ancients called an epilogue, that is, a short recapitulation of what has been said. For every treatment has some principle on which the whole truth of the matter and the force of its meaning rest, and to which everything else is referred. To seek and consider this is to gather. There is one spring and many streams: why follow the windings of the rivers? Hold the spring and you have the whole. I say this because a man's memory is dull and delights in brevity, and if it is divided among many things it becomes less in each. In all learning, then, we ought to gather something brief and sure, to be stored in the little chest of memory, from which the rest may later be drawn out when the matter requires it. This too must often be gone over again and called back from the belly of memory to the palate, so that it does not fade through long neglect. So I ask you, reader, not to rejoice too much if you have read many things, but if you have understood many things; and not only understood them, but been able to keep them. Otherwise neither reading much nor understanding is of any use. That is why, as I recall, I said above that those who give themselves to learning need ability and memory.
De memoria.
De memoria hoc maxime in praesenti praetermittendum non esse existimo, quod sicut ingenium dividendo investigat et invenit, ita memoria colligendo custodit. oportet ergo ut, quae discendo divisimus, commendanda memoriae colligamus. colligere est ea de quibus prolixius vel scriptum vel disputatum est [773A] ad brevem quandam et compendiosam summam redigere, quae a maioribus epilogus, id est, brevis recapitulatio supradictorum appellata est. habet namque omnis tractatio aliquod principium, cui tota rei veritas et vis sententiae innititur, et ad ipsum cuncta alia referuntur. hoc quaerere et considerare colligere est. unus fons est et multi rivuli, quid anfractus fluminum sequeris? tene fontem et totum habes. hoc idcirco dico, quoniam memoria hominis hebes est et brevitate gaudet, et, si in multa dividitur, fit minor in singulis. debemus ergo in omni doctrina breve aliquid et certum colligere, quod in arcula memoriae recondatur, unde postmodum, cum res exigit, reliqua deriventur. hoc etiam saepe replicare et de ventre memoriae ad palatum revocare necesse est, [773B] ne longa intermissione obsoleat. unde rogo te, o lector, ne nimium laeteris si multa legeris, sed si multa intellexeris nec tantum intellexeris sed retinere potueris. alioquin nec legere multum prodest, nec intelligere. quare superius me dixisse recolo eos qui doctrinae operam dant ingenio et memoria indigere.
Chapter XII: On discipline
A certain wise man, asked about the method and form of learning, said: 'A humble mind, eagerness to inquire, a quiet life, silent searching, poverty, a foreign land: these are wont to unlock for many what is obscure in reading.' He had heard, I think, the saying 'Good conduct adorns knowledge', and so to the precepts for reading he joins precepts for living as well, so that the reader may know both the manner of his life and the plan of his study. Knowledge stained by a shameless life deserves no praise. And so whoever seeks knowledge must take the greatest care not to neglect discipline.
De disciplina.
Sapiens quidam cum de modo et forma discendi interrogaretur: Mens, inquit, humilis, studium quaerendi, vita quieta, scrutinium tacitum, paupertas, terra aliena, haec reserare solent multis obscura legendi. audierat, puto, quod dictum est: Mores ornant scientiam, [773C] et ideo praeceptis legendi, praecepta quoque vivendi, adiungit, ut et modum vitae suae et studii sui rationem lector agnoscat. illaudabilis est scientia quam vita maculat impudica. et idcirco summopere cavendum ei qui quaerit scientiam, ut non negligat disciplinam.
Chapter XIII: On humility
The beginning of discipline is humility. Though there are many lessons in it, these three above all concern the reader: first, that he hold no knowledge and no writing cheap; second, that he not be ashamed to learn from anyone; third, that when he has gained knowledge he not look down on others. Many are deceived by wanting to seem wise before their time. From this they break out into a kind of swollen pride, so that they begin both to pretend to be what they are not and to be ashamed of what they are, and they go the further from wisdom the more they think, not of being wise, but of being thought so. I have known many of this kind who, while they still need the first elements, will attend only the highest studies, and think they become great simply by having read the writings or heard the words of the great and wise. 'We have seen them,' they say. 'We have read with them. They often used to speak to us. Those great men, those famous men, know us.' But I would rather no one knew me and I knew everything. You boast that you have seen Plato, not that you have understood him. I suppose it is beneath you, after that, to listen to me. I am not Plato, nor have I deserved to see Plato. Enough for you: you have drunk from the very fountain of philosophy, but I wish you were thirsty still. A king, after golden cups, drinks from an earthenware jar. Why are you ashamed? You have heard Plato; hear Chrysippus too. The proverb says: what you do not know, perhaps Ofellus knows. No one has been given to know everything, and again there is no one who has not received some special gift from nature. The prudent reader, then, listens to everyone gladly, reads everything, and despises no writing, no person and no teaching. From all without distinction he seeks what he sees he lacks, and considers not how much he knows but how much he does not know. Hence, they say, that saying of Plato: 'I would rather learn modestly what belongs to others than thrust forward shamelessly what is mine.' Why are you ashamed to learn, and not ashamed not to know? That shame is greater than the other. Or why do you reach for the heights when you lie at the bottom? Consider rather what your strength can bear. He walks most fittingly who walks in order. Some, wanting to make a great leap, fall headlong. Do not hurry too much, then. In this way you will reach wisdom sooner. Learn gladly from everyone what you do not know, because humility can make common to you what nature made each person's own. You will be wiser than all if you are willing to learn from all. Those who receive from all are richer than all. Finally, hold no knowledge cheap, for all knowledge is good. If you have time, do not scorn to read any writing at least once. If you gain nothing, you lose nothing either, above all since there is no writing, in my judgement, that does not put forward something worth seeking, if it is handled in a fitting place and order; none that does not hold something special, which the careful examiner of words, not having found it elsewhere, gathers with the more pleasure the rarer it is. Yet nothing is good that takes away something better. If you cannot read everything, read the more useful things. Even if you could read everything, the same labour should not be spent on all. Some things should be read so that they are not unknown, others so that they are not unheard of, because we sometimes think more of what we have not heard, and a thing is more easily valued when its fruit is known. You can see now how necessary this humility is for you, so that you hold no knowledge cheap and learn gladly from everyone. Likewise it is good for you, when you begin to know something, not to look down on others. This vice of swollen pride comes to some because they examine their own knowledge too closely, and when they seem to themselves to be something, they think that others, whom they do not know, neither are nor could ever become such. From this too it bubbles up that certain triflers now, boasting of I know not what, accuse the earlier fathers of simplicity, and believe that wisdom was born with them and will die with them. They say that the manner of speaking in the divine writings is so simple that there is no need to hear masters on them, and that anyone can go into the secrets of truth well enough by his own wit. They wrinkle their noses and curl their lips at the readers of divinity, and do not understand that they wrong God, whose words they call simple, a fine word, but mean, in a perverse sense, tasteless. It is not my counsel to imitate men like these. The good reader ought to be humble and gentle, wholly free from empty cares and the lures of pleasure, careful and diligent, so that he learns gladly from all, never presumes on his own knowledge, flees the authors of perverse teaching like poison, learns to handle a matter for a long time before he judges it, seeks not to seem learned but to be so, loves the sayings of the wise once he has understood them, and tries always to keep them before his eyes like a mirror of his own face. And if some things, being rather obscure, do not admit his understanding, let him not at once break out in blame, believing that nothing is good except what he himself has been able to understand. This is the humility of discipline in readers.
De humilitate.
Principium autem disciplinae humilitas est, cuius cum multa sint documenta, haec tria praecipue ad lectorem pertinent: primum, ut nullam scientiam, nullam scripturam vilem teneat, secundum, ut a nemine discere erubescat, tertium, ut cum scientiam adeptus fuerit, ceteros non contemnat. multos hoc decipit, quod ante tempus, sapientes videri volunt. hinc namque in quendam elationis tumorem prorumpunt, [773D] ut iam et simulare incipiant quod non sunt et quod sunt erubescere, eoque longius a sapientia recedunt quo non esse sapientes, sed putari putant. eiusmodi multos novi, qui, cum primis adhuc elementis indigeant, non nisi summis interesse dignantur, et ex hoc solummodo se magnos fieri putant, si magnorum et sapientium vel scripta legerint vel audierint verba. 'nos,' inquiunt, 'vidimus illos. nos ab illis legimus. saepe nobis loqui illi solebant. illi summi, illi famosi, cognovertunt nos.' sed utinam me nemo agnoscat et ego cuncta noverim! Platonem vidisse, non intellexisse gioriamini. puto indignum vobis est deinceps ut me audiatis. non ego sum Plato, nec Platonem videre merui. sufficit vobis: ipsum philosophiae fontem potastis, sed utinam adhuc sitiretis! rex post aurea pocula de vase bibit testeo. quid erubescitis? [774A] Platonem audistis, audiatis et Chrysippum. in proverbio dicitur: Quod tu non nosti, fortassis novit Ofellus. nemo est cui omnia scire datum sit, neque quisquam rursum cui aliquid speciale a natura accepisse non contigerit. prudens igitur lector omnes libenter audit, omnia legit, non scripturam, non personam, non doctrinam spernit. indifferenter ab omnibus quod sibi deesse videt quaerit, nec quantum sciat, sed quantum ignoret, considerat. hinc illud Platonicum aiunt: Malo aliena verecunde discere, quam mea impudenter ingerere. cur enim discere erubescis, et nescire non verecundaris? pudor iste maior est illo. aut quid summa affectas cum tu iaceas in imo? considera potius quid vires tuae ferre valeant. aptissime incedit, qui incedit ordinate. [774B] quidam dum magnum saltum facere volunt, praecipitium incidunt. noli ergo nimis festinare. hoc modo citius ad sapientiam pertinges. ab omnibus libenter disce quod tu nescis, quia humilitas commune tibi facere potest quod natura cuique proprium fecit. sapientior omnibus eris, si ab omnibus discere volueris. qui ab omnibus accipiunt, omnibus ditiores sunt. nullam denique scientiam vilem teneas, quia omnis scientia bona est. nullam, si vacat, scripturam vel saltem legere contemnas. si nihil lucraris, nec perdis aliquid, maxime cum nulla scriptura sit, secundum meam aestimationem, quae aliquid expetendum non proponat, si convenienti loco et ordine tractetur; [774C] quae non aliquid etiam speciale habeat, quod diligens verbi scrutator alibi non inventum, quanto rarius, tanto gratius carpat. nihil tamen bonum est quod melius tollit. si omnia legere non potes, ea quae sunt utiliora lege. etiam si omnia legere potueris, non tamen idem omnibus labor impendendus est. sed quaedam ita legenda sunt ne sint incognita, quaedam vero ne sint inaudita, quia aliquando pluris esse credimus quod non audivimus, et facilius aestimatur res cuius fructus agnoscitur. videre nunc potes quam necessaria tibi sit haec humilitas, ut nullam scientiam vilipendas et ab omnibus libenter discas. similiter tibi quoque expedit, ut, cum tu aliquid sapere coeperis, ceteros non contemnas. [774D] hoc autem tumoris vitium hinc quibusdam accidit, quod suam scientiam nimis diligenter inspiciunt, et cum sibi aliquid esse visi fuerint, alios, quos non noverunt, tales nec esse nec potuisse fieri putant. hinc etiam ebullit, quod nugigeruli nunc quidam, nescio unde, gloriantes, priores patres simplicitatis arguunt, et secum natam, secum morituram credunt sapientiam. in divinis eloquiis ita simplicem loquendi modum esse aiunt, ut in eis magistros audire non oporteat, posse satis quemque proprio ingenio veritatis arcana penetrare. corrugant nasum et valgium torquent in lectores divinitatis, et non intelligunt quod Deo iniuriam faciunt, cuius verba pulchro quidem vocabulo simplicia, sed sensu pravo insipida praedicant. non est mei consilii huiusmodi imitari. bonus enim lector humilis debet esse et mansuetus, [775A] a curis inanibus et voluptatum illecebris prorsus alienus, diligens et sedulus, ut ab omnibus libenter discat, numquam de scientia sua praesumat, perversi dogmatis auctores quasi venena fugiat, diu rem pertractare antequam iudicet discat, non videri doctus, sed esse quaerat, dicta sapientium intellecta diligat, et ea semper coram oculis quasi speculum vultus sui tenere studeat. et si qua forte obscuriora intellectum eius non admiserint, non statim in vituperium prorumpat, ut nihil bonum esse credat, nisi quod ipse intelligere potuit. haec est humilitas disciplinae legentium.
Chapter XIV: On eagerness to inquire
Eagerness to inquire belongs to practice, and here the reader needs encouragement more than teaching. For whoever cares to look closely at what the ancients endured for the love of wisdom, and what memorials of their virtue they left for those after them to remember, will see that his own diligence, whatever it is, falls short. Some trampled on honours, some threw away riches, some rejoiced when wronged, some scorned punishments; some left the company of men, went into the farthest retreats and hidden places of the desert and devoted themselves to philosophy alone, so that they might give themselves to contemplation the more freely, having subjected the mind to none of the desires that usually block the road of virtue. We read that the philosopher Parmenides sat on a rock in Egypt for fifteen years. And Prometheus, it is said, was exposed to the vulture on Mount Caucasus for his excessive care in meditation. Because they knew that the true good is hidden not in men's esteem but in a pure conscience, and that those who cling to perishing things and do not know their own good are no longer men, they showed by the very distance of their dwelling how far they differed from others in mind and understanding, so that one dwelling should not hold those whom one purpose did not join. Someone said to a philosopher: 'Do you not see that people laugh at you?' And he said: 'They laugh at me, and the asses laugh at them.' Think, if you can, how much he valued the praise of those whose blame he did not even fear. Of another we read that after all the studies of the disciplines and the subtleties of the arts he went down to the potter's work. And when the disciples of another were praising their master, among other things they boasted that he did not lack skill even in making shoes. Such diligence I would wish to see in our readers, so that wisdom might never grow old in them. Abishag the Shunammite alone warmed old David, because the love of wisdom does not desert its lover even when the body withers. Almost all the powers of the body change in the old; while wisdom alone grows, the rest decline. For the old age of those who furnished their youth with honourable deeds becomes more learned with age, more sober with use, wiser with the passing of time, and reaps the sweetest fruits of its old studies. Hence that wise man of Greece, Themistocles, when he saw himself dying at the end of a hundred and seven years, is reported to have said that he grieved to leave life just when he had begun to be wise. Plato died writing, in his eighty-first year. Socrates filled ninety-nine years with the pain and labour of teaching and writing. I pass over the other philosophers, Pythagoras, Democritus, Xenocrates, Zeno and Cleanthes, who flourished in the study of wisdom at a great age.
De studio quaerendi.
[775B] Studium quaerendi ad exercitium pertinet, in quo exhortatione magis quam doctrina lector indiget. qui enim diligenter inspicere voluerit quid antiqui propter amorem sapientiae pertulerint, quam memoranda posteris virtutis suae monimenta reliquerint, quamlibet suam diligentiam inferiorem esse videbit. alii calcabant honores, alii proiecerunt divitias, alii acceptis iniuriis gaudebant, alii poenas spreverunt, alii contubernia hominum deserentes, ultimos recessus et secreta eremi penetrantes, soli se philosophiae dedicabant, ut eo contemplationi vacarent liberius, quo nullis quae virtutis iter impedire solent cupiditatibus animum subiecissent. Parmenides philosophus quindecim annis in rupe Aegyptia consedisse legitur. et Prometheus ob immodicam meditandi curam in monte [775C] Caucaso vulturi expositus memoratur. quia enim sciebant verum bonum non in aestimatione hominum sed in pura conscientia esse absconditum, et eos iam non homines esse, qui rebus perituris inhaerentes bonum suum non agnoscerent, ideo, quantum mente et intelligentia a ceteris differrent, ipsa locorum distantia demonstrabant, ne una teneret habitatio quos non eadem sociabat intentio. quidam philosopho referebat dicens: Numquid non vides quia te derident homines? et ille: Ipsi me, inquit, derident, et eos asini. cogita si potes, quanti aestimaverit laudari ab his, a quibus nec vituperari timuit. de alio rursum legitur, [775D] quod post omnia disciplinarum studia et artium acumina ad opus figuli descenderit. et alterius cuiusdam discipuli cum laudibus magistrum suum efferrent, inter cetera nec sutoriae peritia eum carere gloriati sunt. hanc igitur diligentiam in nostris lectoribus es se vellem, ut numquam in eis senesceret sapientia. sola Abisag Sunamitis senem David calefecit quia amor sapientiae etiam marcescente corpore dilectorem suum non deserit. omnes paene virtutes corporis mutantur in senibus, et crescente sola sapientia, decrescunt cetera. senectus enim illorum qui adolescentiam suam honestis actibus instruxerunt, aetate fit doctior, usu tristior, processu temporis sapientior, et veterum studiorum dulcissimos fructus metit. unde et sapiens ille vir Graeciae, Themistocles, [776A] cum expletis centum septem annis se mori cerneret, dixisse fertur se dolere quod egrederetur de vita quando sapere coepisset. Plato lxxxi anno scribens mortuus est. Socrates xcviiii annos in docendi scribendique dolore laboreque complevit. taceo ceteros philosophos, Pythagoram, Democritum, Xenocratem, Zenonem, et Eleantem qui iam aetate longaeva in sapientiae studiis floruerunt.
I come to the poets: Homer, Hesiod, Simonides and Stesichorus, who, great in years, sang, as death drew near, something swan-like, I know not what, and sweeter than usual. When Sophocles, after a very long old age and neglect of his household, was accused of madness by his sons, he recited to the judge the story of Oedipus which he had lately written, and gave such a proof of wisdom in an age already broken that he turned the severity of the court into the applause of the theatre. No wonder, since even Cato the Censor, the most eloquent of the Romans, was neither ashamed nor in despair to learn Greek letters when already old. Homer certainly tells that from the tongue of Nestor, already aged and nearly decrepit, flowed speech sweeter than honey. Notice, then, how much they loved wisdom whom not even decrepit age could call back from seeking it. This great love of wisdom, then, this abundance of prudence in the old, is fittingly gathered also from the meaning of the name mentioned above. For Abishag is interpreted 'my father superabundant', or 'my father's roaring', which shows that in the old there dwells a thunder of divine speech, most abundant and beyond the human voice. For the word 'superabundant' here means fullness, not excess. Further, 'Shunammite' in our language means 'scarlet', which can quite fittingly signify the fervour of wisdom.
Ad poetas venio, Homerum, Hesiodum, Simonidem, Tersicorum, qui grandes natu cycneum nescio quid et solito dulcius vicina morte cecinerunt. Sophocles cum post nimiam senectutem, et rei familiaris neglegentiam, a filiis accusaretur amentiae, Oedippi fabulam, quam nuper scripserat, recitavit iudici, et tantum sapientiae in aetate iam fracta specimen dedit, [776B] ut severitatem tribunalium in favorem theatri converteret. nec mirum cum etiam Cato censorius et Romani generis disertissimus, iam senex graecas litteras discere nec erubuerit nec desperaverit. certe Homerus refert quod de lingua Nestoris, iam vetuli et paene decrepiti, dulcior melle oratio fluxerit. animadverte igitur quantum amaverint sapientiam quos nec decrepita aetas ab eius inquisitione potuit revocare. iste igitur tantus amor sapientiae, tanta in senibus prudentiae abundantia, congrue etiam ex ipsius supradicti nominis interpretatione colligitur. interpretatur enim Abisag, pater meus superfluus, vel, patris mei rugitus, ex quo ostenditur abundantissimum, et ultra humanam vocem [776C] in senibus divini sermonis tonitruum commorari. verbum namque superfluum in hoc loco plenitudinem, non redundantiam, significat. porro Sunamitis in lingua nostra coccinea dicitur, quod satis convenienter fervorem sapientiae significare potest.
Chapter XV: On the four remaining precepts
The four that follow are arranged alternately, so that one always looks to discipline and the next to practice.
De quattuor reliquis praeceptis.
Quattuor quae sequuntur sic alternatim disposita sunt, ut alterum semper ad disciplinam, alterum ad exercitium spectet.
Chapter XVI: On quiet
Quiet of life, whether inward, so that the mind does not run about through unlawful desires, or outward, so that leisure and opportunity are at hand for honourable and useful studies: both belong to discipline.
De quiete.
Vitae quies, sive interior, ut mens per illicita desideria non discurrat, sive exterior, ut otium et opportunitas honestis et utilibus studiis suppetat, utraque ad disciplinam pertinet.
Chapter XVII: On searching
Searching, that is, meditation, looks to practice. Searching seems, however, to be contained under eagerness to inquire. If that is true, it is repeated needlessly, since it was counted in the earlier part. But it should be known that the difference between these two is this: eagerness to inquire means persistence in work; searching means diligence in meditation. Work is carried through by labour and love; counsel is brought forth by care and watchfulness. Labour is that you act; love, that you finish. Care is that you foresee; watchfulness, that you attend. These are the four attendants who carry the litter of Philology, because they exercise the mind over which wisdom presides. For the chair of Philology is the seat of wisdom, which is said to be carried by these four set beneath it, since it advances by exercising itself in them. Hence it is finely said that young men, for their strength, hold the litter at the front, namely philos and kophos, that is, love and labour, because they carry the work through outwardly; and at the back, girls, namely philemia and agrimnia, which means care and watchfulness, because they bring forth counsel inwardly, in secret. Some think that the chair of Philology signifies the human body, over which the rational soul presides, carried by four servants, that is, composed of the four elements: of these the two higher, fire and air, are masculine in action and in name, and the two lower, earth and water, feminine.
[776D] De scrutinio.
Scrutinium autem, id est, meditatio, ad exercitium spectat. videtur autem scrutinium sub studio quaerendi contineri. quod, si verum est, superfluo repetitur, cum in superiori parte annumeratum sit. sed sciendum est hanc inter haec duo esse differentiam, quod studium quaerendi instantiam significat operis, scrutinium vero diligentiam meditationis. opus peragunt labor et amor, consilium pariunt cura et vigilia. in labore est, ut agas, in amore, ut perficias. in cura est, ut provideas, in vigilia, ut attendas. isti sunt quattuor pedisequi qui portant lecticam philologiae, quia mentem exercent cui sapientia praesidet. cathedra quippe philologiae sedes est sapientiae, quae his suppositis gestari dicitur, quoniam in his se exercendo promovetur. [777A] unde pulchre iuvenes propter robur a fronte lecticam tenere dicuntur, videlicet, philos et kophos, id est, amor et labor, quia foris opus peragunt; a posteriori, puellae, videlicet, philemia et agrimnia, quod interpretatur cura et vigilia, quia intus in secreto consilium pariunt. sunt quidam qui putant per cathedram philologiae humanum corpus significari, cui anima rationalis praesidet, quod ministri quattuor portant, id est, quattuor elementa componunt, e quibus duo superiora, id est, ignis et aer, actu et nomine masculina sunt, duo vero inferiora, id est, terra et aqua, feminina.
Chapter XVIII: On frugality
He wished to urge poverty on readers too, that is, not to chase after superfluous things, which looks above all to discipline. For a fat belly, as the saying goes, does not beget a fine mind. But what will the students of our time be able to answer to this, who not only scorn to follow frugality in their studies, but even labour to seem richer than they are? Nor does each now boast of what he has learned, but of what he has spent. But perhaps that is because they do not want to imitate their masters, about whom I cannot find words worthy enough.
De parcitate.
[777B] Paupertatem quoque lectoribus suadere voluit, id est, superflua non sectari, quod maxime ad disciplinam spectat. Pinguis enim venter, ut dicitur, tenuem non gignit sensum. sed quid ad haec scholares nostri temporis respondere poterunt, qui non solum in studiis suis frugalitatem sequi contemnunt, sed etiam supra id quod sunt divites videri laborant? [778A] nec iam quid didicerit quisque iactitat, sed quid expenderit. sed fortassis quia magistros suos imitari nolunt, de quibus, quid satis digne dicam, non invenio.
Chapter XIX: On exile
Last is set a foreign land, which also exercises a man. The whole world is exile to those who love wisdom. Yet, as someone says:
By what sweetness I know not, the native soil draws all men,
And does not let them forget it.
It is a great beginning of virtue that the mind, exercised little by little, learns first to exchange these visible and passing things, so that afterwards it may be able to leave them behind altogether. He is still tender to whom his homeland is sweet; he is already strong to whom every soil is his homeland; but he is perfect to whom the whole world is exile. The first has fixed his love on the world, the second has scattered it, the third has put it out. From boyhood I have been an exile, and I know with what grief the mind sometimes leaves the narrow floor of a poor man's hut, and with what freedom it afterwards looks down on marble halls and panelled ceilings.
Level 4 ends here. Back to the Level 4 guide
De exsilio.
Postremo terra aliena posita est, quae et ipsa quoque hominem exercet. omnis mundus philosophantibus exsilium est, quia tamen, ut ait quidam:
Nescio qua natale solum dulcedine cunctos
Ducit, et immemores non sinit esse sui.
magnum virtutis principium est, ut discat paulatim exercitatus animus visibilia haec et transitoria primum commutare, ut postmodum possit etiam derelinquere. [778B] delicatus ille est adhuc cui patria dulcis est; fortis autem iam, cui omne solum patria est; perfectus vero, cui mundus totus exsilium est. ille mundo amorem fixit, iste sparsit, hic exstinxit. ego a puero exsulavi, et scio quo maerore animus artum aliquando pauperis tugurii fundum deserat, qua libertate postea marmoreos lares et tecta laqueata despiciat.